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RELIGION AND THE SEARCH FOR A
PRINCIPLED MIDDLE GROUND ON
ABORTION
Michael W. McConnell*
THE PoLITics OF VIRTUE: Is ABORTION DEBATABLE? By Elizabeth
Mensch and Alan Freeman. Durham: Duke University Press. 1993.
Pp. x, 268. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $14.95.

1
Religious arguments and movements have been central to virtually
every important public debate in American history from independence
and abolition to civil rights and the nuclear freeze. Nonetheless, many
legal theorists claim that this involvement of religion with politics
presents a problem for our constitutional order. Recently, religious
voices have played a prominent role in the controversy over abortion
especially, though not exclusively, on the anti-abortion side. This
has generated a surge of new writing about the role of religion in publie life. In the most serious entry in the field, John Rawls maintains
that a society may justly base its laws only on a "reasonable" political
conception of justice, meaning a conception that is, or can be, "shared
by citizens regarded as free and equal" and that does not presuppose
any particular "comprehensive doctrine," of which religious doctrine
is a prime example.' Applying this idea to the abortion issue, Rawls
concludes (without much discussion) that "any comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of political values excluding" the right to
an abortion by a "mature adult" woman in the first trimester "is to
that extent unreasonable," because the "political value of the equality
of women is overriding."'2 This means, apparently, that the contrary
balance - treating the life of the unborn as the "overriding value" is not just wrong but beyond the boundaries of reasonable argument,
in part because it rests on a "comprehensive doctrine" (though why
respect for unborn life rests on a comprehensive doctrine while respect
3
for the equality of women does not is something of a mystery).
* William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago. B.A. 1976, Michigan State;
J.D. 1979, University of Chicago. - Ed. The author wishes to thank Martha Nussbaum for
comments on an earlier draft.
1. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 176 (1993) (reviewed in this issue by Professor
Joshua Cohen - Ed.).
2. Id at 243 n.32.
3. Admittedly, Rawls's book is not about abortion, and his comments on the issue are confined to a lengthy footnote. Presumably he would have more to say if he chose to say it. This,
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In a more rhetorical vein, Ronald Dworkin, having concluded that
opposition to abortion has "at least a quasi-religious nature," goes on
to tell us that "it is no part of the proper business of government" to
enforce laws based on such premises.4 "[I]t is a terrible form of tyranny, destructive of moral responsibility, for the community to impose
tenets of spiritual faith or conviction on individuals." '5 Note that this
position does not depend on the character of the rules regulating abortion; judgments based on "tenets of spiritual faith" are simply excluded from public discourse. Anthony Lewis, a respected New York
Times columnist, has written that the "essential truth about most antiabortion activists" is that they are "religious fanatics, who want to
impose their version of God's word on the rest of us." 6 This puts them
outside the bounds of "our form of democracy, which requires com'7
promise and does not work when there are ideological certainties."
Again, one might ask: How willing are advocates of the opposite side
to compromise? Are there not "ideological certainties" in secular
political discourse? Nor are arguments of this sort confined to writers
and academics. Popular pro-choice rhetoric commonly brands religious thought about abortion intolerant, extremist, and illegitimate.,
In the language of street protests: "Keep your rosaries out of our
ovaries!"
Come now Elizabeth Mensch and Alan Freeman, professors of law
at SUNY-Buffalo and close students of the religious debate over abortion in the United States in the past forty years. No one will accuse
Mensch and Freeman of being members of the religious right. As feminists and early enthusiasts of the critical legal studies movement, with
backgrounds in left Protestantism (Mensch) and Judaism (Freeman),
they would seem unlikely voices to rise in defense of religious discourse about abortion and other contentious issues of public morality
and policy. The book is all the more striking for their disclosure in the
introduction that each of them has had "more than one firsthand experience of abortion" (p. 3). This experience they describe as "almost
perfect irresponsibility, of the kind that absolutely precludes self-righteousness" (p. 3). These authors have produced a book that is by far
however, makes the comments all the more perplexing, for Rawls - an apparently careful and
open-minded scholar - is willing to dismiss the opinions of a quarter of the population as beyond the pale of reason on the strength of nothing more than a few conclusory sentences in a
footnote.
4. RONALD DWORKIN, Ln's DOMINION 15 (1993) (reviewed in this issue by Professor
Alexander Capron - Ed.).
5. Id.
6. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Right to Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A29.
7. Id.
8. For numerous examples of such comments, as well as epithets flowing in the opposite
direction, see JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 143-

56 (1991). See also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993) (reviewed in this
issue by Professor Sanford Levinson - Ed.).
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the most comprehensive yet concise, sympathetic yet critical, account
of theological thought on the issue of abortion.
Their heterodoxical conclusion is that religious thinking about
abortion - which was interrupted by the constitutional close out of
Roe v. Wade9 - was more nuanced, less absolutist, more tolerant of
good-faith disagreement, more closely attuned to the moral perceptions of the people, and more conducive to compromise than the secular constitutional discourse that replaced it. But this conclusion is not,
like most theorizing on the subject, based on a priori conceptions. The
book is not really an argument at all, but simply a description of the
debate as it unfolded in the churches and synagogues of America between the end of World War II and the decision in Roe. Far from
being divorced from public values, this discourse, according to
Mensch and Freeman, was the prime forum for deliberation about
public values. The book thus transcends the specific issue of abortion
and addresses the process of forming moral judgments in our pluralistic democracy. "The larger question," the authors say, "is whether we
can recover a meaningful public moral vocabulary" (p. 5). The "alchemical fantasy of liberalism - that process can turn itself into substance - is belied by the reality of conflict" (p. 5; footnote omitted).
Their book, The Politics of Virtue: Is Abortion Debatable?,poses the
question: "Can a revival of theological traditions... serve such an
enterprise?" (p. 5).
If Mensch and Freeman were to engage Rawls in conversation, I
think they would agree with his first criterion of reasonableness (that
public debate must be based on conceptions that are, or can be,
"shared by citizens regarded as free and equal"10 ), but they would
maintain that one is most, not least, likely to find such discussion in
theological circles. The various communities of faith have been engaged in discourse about morality and public justice for centuries and
have produced most of the bedrock of modem ethics - even ethics
that appears, on the surface, strictly secular. As the authors point out,
the secular systems of Hume and Kant presupposed the survival of
Calvinist (Hume) or Lutheran (Kant) substantive ethics, even as they
undermined the epistemological basis of the religious world view (p.
153). Moreover, there is something odd about Rawls's argument in a
nation in which religion is so important to so many people. Threefourths of American women and a lesser proportion of American men,
the authors point out, "report that they consider religious faith the
most important influence on their lives" (p. 4). Can we honestly regard our fellow citizens as "free and equal" if we rule out-of-bounds
the reasons they conscientiously adopt as a ground for their thinking
about public issues?
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 176.
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The moral teachings of the major religions of America are starting
points for serious deliberation in which any person - believer and
nonbeliever alike - can engage. By contrast, the authors observe,
most secular discussion of abortion since Roe has been strident, acrimonious, and largely unilluminating. Rawls's own dismissal of the
pro-life position as "unreasonable" and not requiring further discussion is a sobering example of a secular "close out" - not different, in
principle, from those who say, "The Bible says it, I believe it, and that
resolves it."
I think, however, that Mensch and Freeman would disagree with
Rawls's second criterion (that positions in the debate must not presuppose a particular comprehensive doctrine). It is only the traditions
built on comprehensive doctrine - secular as well as religious - that
have anything useful to say about ultimate questions such as life and
death, freedom and obligation, and the proper reaches of justice and
compassion. If we do not include comprehensive doctrines in our discussions, we will be left with nothing but sterile proceduralism and
moral assertions uprooted from their source and foundation.
Perhaps the most distinctive virtue of religious participation in
public life, according to the authors, is that religion places the concerns and the powers of this world in proper perspective - they are
important, but not controlling:
Religion in the United States provides both an incentive to act responsibly in the world, and it also offers that "pause" which makes complete
allegiance to any political order impossible. This is why religion provides a counterforce to totalizing secular ideologies, whether of the right
or left - so long, that is, as churches resist the temptation to identify
themselves too fully with the state. [p. 149]
This book should be required reading for anyone who wishes to
contend that religious participation in resolving issues of public concern is inconsistent with our national commitment to free, openminded debate and inquiry.
II
Quite apart from their analysis of the abortion question, Mensch
and Freeman have provided an insightful primer into the intellectual
history of political theology in postwar America. The authors discuss
the natural law tradition that flourished in the aftermath of the Holocaust and Nuremberg but floundered in the conflicts of the 1960s; the
ecumenical spirit of the 1950s, with its tendency toward complacency
in the public sphere; the profound, but profoundly misunderstood,
theology of Barth and Bonhoeffer, which inspired Martin Luther King
and led to the social activism of mainstream Protestant churches in
the civil rights era; the emergence of fundamentalist Christianity from
its pietistic cocoon into a powerful public voice; the secularization of
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mainstream Protestantism; and the growing division between conservative and liberal theological movements in the years before and
after Roe. To anyone unfamiliar with these developments, the book
serves as an excellent introduction; but even to those well versed in the
period, the book is studded with often surprising insights - especially
in drawing connections between theological developments and parallel
developments in jurisprudential thought. Much of this interest arises
from the authors' own quirky point of view. The overall impression
the book conveys is one of great fair-mindedness, but this is accomplished, not by a dispassionate and "objective" recital of the various
positions, but rather by a sympathetic engagement with each.
The authors concentrate on four great traditions: natural law (particularly associated with Roman Catholicism but not exclusive to it),
Reformed Protestantism (especially as informed by the life and teachings of Barth and Bonhoeffer), Protestant fundamentalism (which
shades over into evangelicalism more broadly), and liberal (what they
call "secularized") Protestantism. In the final chapters of the book,
they describe the way in which these theological traditions interacted
in the late 1960s - before Roe - to produce a rich and promising
discourse about abortion (pp. 98-125). Their treatment of these issues
is both thoughtful and well informed. It is, however, uneven. There is
no sustained discussion of Jewish thought: some individual Jewish
thinkers, such as Edmond Cahn, are included, but not in the context
of an account of Jewish theological ethics. Within Christian thought,
the discussion of the Protestant tradition is richer and more interesting
than that devoted to Roman Catholicism. Oddly, Catholic thinking is
most prominently, though not exclusively, represented by philosophers A.P. d'Entr~ves and Jacques Maritain and law professor and
now appellate judge John Noonan, rather than by ecclesiastics or theologians. There is only limited discussion of official Church pronouncements on the relation between religious teaching and public policy in
general, or on abortion in particular.
More specifically, the authors neglect any discussion of the important question of authority within the Catholic Church and whether as critics of the Church maintain - the special claim of the Church
hierarchy to teaching authority binding to some extent on the consciences of faithful Catholics is problematic within our constitutional
order. Instead, Mensch and Freeman concentrate on the substance of
Catholic ethical theology, observing that "[i]f theological argument is
to play a valuable role in public debate, it must appeal not to privileged authority but to some version of the common good, as Catholic
tradition has in fact recognized" (p. 5). This might seem to beg the
question, because "appeals to privileged authority" and "versions of
the common good" are not logically exclusive categories. There
might, after all, be reasons grounded in the common good for recognizing privileged authority - for example, that of the Constitution
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and its Framers, the common law, the long-standing customs and traditions of the people, and so on. But the authors do not pursue the
problem.
The authors' analysis of these four traditions exposes a paradox,
which I have not seen remarked upon in any of the theoretical discussions of the role of religion in politics. The paradox is this: the most
sectarian and nonrationalist of the religious movements - that arising
from Barth and Bonhoeffer - is also the most nuanced, uncategorical,
and nondogmatic on the subject of abortion, as well as the most intellectually compatible with postmodern theory and political praxis.
Mensch and Freeman note that "the Catholic natural law tradition
has been successfully universalized," losing, as a result, "its distinctly
Christian character," and that, by contrast, "the ethics of serious Reformation theology can sound stubbornly sectarian, too peculiarly
Christian to have any relevance to the world outside the Christian
church" (p. 48).
This observation warrants particular attention, because natural
law has been widely misunderstood."1 Natural law, in the Catholic
tradition, is a species of divine law - as all law is ultimately divine in
its source and authority - but can be discerned through the application of natural reason to the world around us. Natural law stands in
contradistinction to revealed law. Even in the Middle Ages, as the
authors explain, natural law theorists "did not depend on revelation.... Aquinas had carefully stated that the divine law, revealed

through grace, perfects, but does not overturn, the human law that is
based on natural reason" (p. 35). Thus, while some subjects

-

the

authors give the example of "a proper understanding of the Trinity"
(p. 35) - depend on revelation, "for most affairs of the world, natural
reason would suffice" (p. 35). A prohibition on genocide, for example,

can be "rooted in an understanding of the nature and purpose of humanity that is accessible to natural reason alone" (p. 35).

This distinction is crucial to the question of public discourse, because Christians were not thought to have any privileged position with
regard to natural reason; indeed, their great authority on many questions of natural law was the pagan philosopher Aristotle. Natural law
thinking is therefore, in Rawls's terminology, something that can be
"shared by citizens regarded as free and equal." 1 2 That does not
mean, of course, that everyone will agree with the premises of natural
law thinking. Much of modern positivist ethics is based on the cate11. For example, during the debates over the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to the
Supreme Court, many politicians and some scholars professed to find the idea of natural law

troubling, apparently confusing natural law with specifically religious teachings. See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, "NaturalLaw" and the Nominee, N.Y. TiMEs, July 15, 1991, at A15,
and my response, Michael W. McConnell, Trashing NaturalLaw,N.Y. TiMs, Aug. 16, 1991, at
A23.
12. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 176.
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gorical denial that the ought is inferable from the is, and - as will be
seen below - an important strain of Reformed Protestantism denies
that any inferences about the good can be drawn from the character of
a fallen world. But even though not everyone can share its premises,
natural law methodology is "accessible" in the sense that the evidence
on which it rests is equally discernible, in principle, by all persons
without reference to any idiosyncrasies of creed, culture, or
perspective.
Catholic teaching on abortion is based squarely on natural law, not
on revelation. "Catholic doctrine takes abortion to be a violation of
natural law, which means that understanding it to be a wrong should
not require Christian faith or church authority" (pp. 35-36). In this
sense, the claim in Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services 13 that anti-abortion laws are "theological" is based on a mistaken understanding of Catholic teaching. "Ensoulment" is just a way of talking about humanity, and in its reliance
on Aristotelian biology, the Church was not being "theological" but
simply incorporating into its ethics the best science of its day. That is
why, with the nineteenth-century advances in knowledge of human
embryology, the Church intensified its opposition to abortions of prequickening fetuses.
Having made that point, the authors do not pause to wonder:, If
Catholic natural law thinking is entirely based on natural reason, what
does this have to say about the value of religious participation in public policy? Does this not suggest that, even within the Church, serious
ethical philosophers consider it necessary to divorce themselves from
the distinctively religious aspect of knowledge - that is, revelation and to rely on that aspect of knowledge in which the Christian, the
Jew, and the infidel stand on an equal footing? In their defense of
religious participation in public deliberation, have not the authors inadvertently denigrated the importance of theology? One might conclude that while natural law is a permissible basis for public
deliberation, sacred writings and spiritual associations have nothing
distinctive to contribute. Perhaps the richness of ethical deliberation
within the various religious communities is a product, not of their
character as religious, but of their character as ethical communities communities that devote themselves to ethical questions, that have a
certain, albeit incomplete, insulation from passing fads and earthly authorities, and that take seriously both the claims of the past and their
obligations to the future. Perhaps God has nothing to do with it.
This question arises again - though without explicit commentary
from the authors - in the chapter on Protestant fundamentalists and
evangelicals. 14 This is a remarkable chapter in its ability to see the
13. 492 U.S. 490, 568 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. Pp. 74-82. The authors use the term fundamentalist to describe a movement within
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world from the perspective of a group that is almost completely unrepresented and frequently derided in academic circles. In elite circles,
fundamentalists are generally thought to be ignorant, irrational, emotional, and lacking in independence. In a revealing incident last year,
the Washington Post stated in a front-page news story that fundamentalists "are largely poor, uneducated and easy to command" - an offensive generalization that it retracted the next day.15 In fact,
fundamentalism is highly rationalistic, individualistic, and distrustful
of emotion as a guide to right conduct. As Mensch and Freeman note,
"[d]espite common misconception, biblical inerrancy, or fundamentalism, does not represent a retreat from science to blind irrationalism"
(p. 78). The goal of fundamentalist theology, they say, quoting
Princeton theologian Charles Hodge, is to "gain the 'assent to the
truth, or the persuasion of the mind.' "16 They quote J. Gresham
Machen, the Presbyterian theologian expelled from Princeton after the
victory of liberal theology:
"Theology... is just as much a science as is chemistry... [. T]he two
sciences, it is true, differ widely in their subject matter; they differ widely
in the character of the evidence upon which these conclusions are based;
in particular they differ widely in the qualifications required of the investigator: but they are both sciences, because they are both concerned with
the acquisition and orderly arrangement of a body of truth."' 17
The implications of this Bible-centered world view are individualistic,
because no human agent may come between the believer and the Word
- thus resulting in a theological egalitarianism - and rationalistic,
because the believer must apply the rational faculty of reading and
understanding to gain access to the perfect Word of God and must
distrust his own emotion and instinct, which are products of a fallen
nature. As a historical matter, one can see the liberal democratic order as a product of this Protestant doctrine - democracy being the
"priesthood of all believers" in the political sphere.
Unlike natural law, the fundamentalist world view is based on revelation as the only entirely reliable source of knowledge, coupled with
Protestant Christianity that, under their definition, embraces most evangelicals as well. Both

fundamentalists and evangelicals are inerrantists, meaning that they accept absolutely the truth
of the Bible as it came from God. Evangelicals, however, are not committed to a literalist hermeneutic. For convenience' sake, I will adopt the authors' practice of using the termfundamentalist to embrace both, but with some trepidation, for the term fundamentalist is often used as a
term of opprobrium. I do not mean it as such, and neither (I think) do Mensch and Freeman.
15. Michael Weisskopf, Energized by PulpitofPassion, the Public Is Calling; "Gospel Grape.
vine" Displays Strength in Controversy over Military Gay Ban, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1993, at Al,
A10. The next day, the newspaper admitted that "[t]here is no factual basis for that statement."
Corrections,WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1993, at A3. In the retraction, the paper reported that, according to a nationwide poll, 38% of Americans identifying themselves as "Evangelical-Born Again"
Christians had some college education, as compared to 45% of all Americans. Id.
16. P. 78 (quoting Forrest M. Baird, Shaeffer's Intellectual Roots, in REFLECTONS ON
FRANCIS SCHAEFFER 45, 47 (Ronald W. Ruegsegger ed., 1986) (quoting Charles Hodge)).
17. Pp. 78-79 (quoting Baird, supra note 16, at 53 (quoting J. Gresham Machen)).
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empirical observations about the world, in the tradition of Scottish
"Common Sense" philosophy. Fundamentalism thus raises two interesting and important questions that the authors do not address. First
is a question of interpretation: To what extent is fundamentalist
teaching against abortion based on revelation? From an internal perspective, the answer is that it is entirely based on revelation, but this
may be because of the powerful way in which students of a particular
text are able to use it to illuminate the world. In fact, the authors
point out that the scriptural texts cited in support of the pro-life position are less than determinate (p. 17). From a Biblical perspective, it is
difficult to see the abortion question "as one of private rights alone"
(p. 17), but that does not obviate discussion of the content of the answer (what are the roles of excuse, justification, enforceability, and
prudence?). In other words, those who take the Bible's injunctions
regarding the value of life seriously will be unlikely to buy the privacy
argument (that abortion does not present a question of public justice)
but need not necessarily insist on criminal prohibitions in all cases
from the moment of conception, any more than they must oppose capital punishment or favor extensive welfare programs. It may well be
that fundamentalists derive their normative premises from Scripture
but their empirical and prudential data from elsewhere.
My own impression of evangelical thinking about abortion is that,
for most, abortion presents a quite simple and straightforward question of justice, much like infanticide, and that evangelicals tend to assume that the denial by pro-choice advocates of what appear to be
obvious facts of life is attributable to pride and selfishness rather than
to any conscientious doubt that an unborn child is a child. This means
that the contribution of evangelicals to the pro-life movement has been
more in their commitment and determination than in their ability to
communicate and convince outsiders.
The second question is whether the reliance by some citizens on
revelation is problematic within our constitutional order. As on the
issue of authority within the Catholic tradition, the authors have surprisingly little to say about the question of revelation within Protestantism - perhaps because, in their judgment, most religious
deliberation is less reliant on mere authority or revelation than it may
appear. At first blush, an appeal to revealed truth may appear to be
less "universalistic" - less "accessible" - than reliance on natural
law, because not everyone accepts the Bible as the source of revealed
truth. The fundamentalist, however, has a powerful response. The
fundamentalist would point out that God's revelation through the Bible is to all persons and not to a select subset of the population and
that there are good reasons why all rational persons, if fully informed
and able to evaluate the matter dispassionately - that is to say, free of
the blinders of sin - could and should accept the Bible as truth. That
some persons do not presently agree with the premise of the funda-
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mentalist argument does not make the argument any less universal or
accessible. If we waited for a set of premises to which everyone could
agree, we would be waiting forever. Indeed, many rational individuals
deny the essential premise of natural law - that nature is normative.
Does that mean that natural law is not accessible to all?
In any event, it is striking that the more rationalistic strains of
Christianity have tended to take the hardest line against abortion.
This is not true of the modem Reformed tradition, most powerfully
represented by Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. This tradition, as
the authors point out, is "peculiarly Christian" and "stubbornly sectarian" (p. 48), yet more equivocal on the issue of abortion. The great
Barmen Declaration of the German Confessing Church, drafted by
Barth, "repudiates" the idea that citizens can and should base their
judgments about questions ofjustice on something other than the comprehensive doctrines they deem to be true: "We repudiate the false
teaching that there are areas of our life in which we belong not to
Jesus Christ but another Lord, areas in which we do not need justification and sanctification through him."8 Barth strenuously criticizes
the very idea of natural law: How can observation of the characteristics of a fallen world tell us anything about the will of a perfect God?
Even more than fundamentalism, which tends to assume that God's
revelation through Scripture is ultimately identical to His revelation
through the natural world, Barth's radical Protestantism posits a disjunction between revelation and natural reason.
Much of the impulse behind the postwar natural law movement
was the brush with a universal evil and the recognition (at Nuremberg
and elsewhere) of the limits of positive law. It is therefore something
of a shock to learn that "the only serious institutional Christian opposition to Hitler in Germany arose, not on the basis of natural law, but
rather quite explicitly and emphatically in the context of rejecting natural law" (pp. 46-47). At a time when mainstream German Protestantism, invoking natural law, was reconciled to Hitler, Barth was
banished and Bonhoeffer executed for their theologically uncompromising opposition to the Nazi regime. As Mensch and Freeman explain, Barth recognized that "if church and culture were too bound
together by the link of a natural law theology, then contingent human
projects (politics, science, cultural traditions) could claim the status of
ontological reality, not subject to God's revealed word" (p. 55).
In other words, the very willingness of German Protestants to assimilate their ethics into the overlapping consensus of German culture
deprived them of their vantage point for descrying the coming evil of
18. P. 49 (quoting EDWIN H. ROBERTSON, THE SHAME AND THE SACRIFICE: THE LIFE
117 (1988) (quoting THE BARMEN THEOLOGICAL

AND TEACHING Of DIETRICH BONHOEFFER

DECLARATION

(1934), reprintedin EBERHARD

JONGEL, CHRIST, JUSTICE AND PEACE at xxi (D.

Bruce Hamill & Alan J. Torrance trans., T.&T. Clark 1992) (DECLARATION translated by Douglas S. Bax))).
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Nazism. By the same token, the sectarianism of Barth and Bonhoeffer
insulated them and their fellow radical Christians from being coopted. The radically unsecular character of Barthian thought is captured in this excellent summary:
Could one reject abstract normative categories, whether derived from
natural law or the secularized rationalism of Kant, and nevertheless
fashion an ethics that would require responsible action in the world?
The answer for both Barth and Bonhoeffer lay not in ethics itself (based
on a supposed knowledge of the world and the operation of human reason), but in theology - in the dialectical process of looking first "upward," as it were, to the command of God, which is a divinely initiated
and revealed claim, the call to the covenant "I-Thou" relationship, and
then downward, to a particular person in a particular context. The content of the command is known only by virtue of another dialectic - that
of incarnation and redemption - so that the (impossible) command is
always accompanied by the promise of grace .... [pp. 56-57]
In Barthian theology, there is no danger of becoming so universalized that God ceases to be of importance. According to the authors'
exegesis of Barth, "only God, not 'natural' human beings, made the
correct operation of reason in nature possible" (p. 55). In Barth's
words, quoted by the authors, "'[R]eason, if left entirely without
grace, is incurably sick and incapable of any serious theological activity. Only when it has been illumined, or at least provisionally shone
upon by faith,' can it produce statements of truth about the human
and natural world . .. " 19 In Barth's hand this is not an attack on
science but rather a sophisticated epistemology strikingly akin to modem, nonpositivistic philosophy of science. 20 The authors comment:
"Modem science does, in fact, resemble sophisticated theology more
than it resembles the elaborate claims of certainty that are more typical of Newtonian physics, and too often, ironically, of social science as
well" (p. 54). In Barth's view, "all scientific knowledge is necessarily
contingent, with its particular methodology suited to its own specific
object of study," and "all science is rooted in a faith that the object of
study will reveal itself, at least provisionally, through the method fashioned by scientists within their traditions" (pp. 53-54). According to
Barth, theology "knows itself to rest on sheer contingency" 2 1 - but in
this it is no different from any other field of knowledge. Positivism is
erroneous in both theology and science.
Fundamentalism and Barthian neo-orthodoxy thus start from similar premises about the primacy of revelation and have similar aspira19. Pp. 55-56 (quoting KARL BARTH, Nol: Answer to Emil Brunner (1934), reprinted in
NATURAL THEOLOGY 65, 96 (Peter Fraenkel trans., photo. reprint 1962) (1946)).
20. See p. 54.
21. P. 54 (quoting Harold Nebelsick, Karl Barth's Understandingof Science, in THEOLOGY
BEYOND CHRISTENDOM: ESSAYS ON THE CENTENARY OF THE BIRTH OF KARL BARTH, MAY

10, 1886, at 165, 182 (John Thompson ed., 1986) (quoting Karl Barth)).
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tions to a "scientific" quality, but there the resemblance ends.
Fundamentalism, with its Common Sense philosophy, resembles positivist science in its pursuit of objective truth. Neo-orthodoxy, with its
antifoundationalist epistemology, lives comfortably in a postmodern
intellectual universe.
Barth rejects the casuistical method of natural lawyers. It is not
possible, according to Barth, to move from particular texts, norms, or
objective categories to universal rules that could govern the "plenitude
of conditions and possibilities." 22 Indeed, not only is this "logically
impossible," but it leads both to "unwarranted arrogance" - to set
oneself up as the judge of good and evil in the place of God - and to
the destruction of human freedom (p. 58). The "casuist ethics" of the
natural lawyers "calls a person away from real responsibility" (p. 58).
For Barth and Bonhoeffer, "the gospel" - not natural reason - "was
the core of ethics - the command that is fulfilled by the life lived
wholly for the neighbor" (p. 57). This ethics cannot be worked out in
rules or confined to regulations; it requires a kind of selflessness that is
possible only through the joyous submission of the believer to the will
of God. In Bonhoeffer's words, "[lt is evident that the only appropriate conduct of men before God is the doing of His will." 23 Our "relation to God is a new life in 'existence for others,' through participation
in the being of Jesus. The transcendental is not infinite and unattainable tasks, but the neighbor who is within reach in any given
situation."2 4
Although they give other perspectives respectful consideration,
Mensch and Freeman are apparently most impressed with the possibilities of Reformed Protestantism as a basis for moral deliberation.
This tradition, they find, is best able to "reject the pressure to conform
to the rest of culture or to produce false moral universals" and to
"concentrate instead on a thick description of its own tradition" (pp.
145-46). In this theology they find it possible to avoid the "stark
choice" between "ecumenical 'publicness,' on the one hand, and sectarian 'privateness,' on the other" (p. 145). Paradoxically, the least
universal and accessible theology produces the most open and productive political theology.
III
The implications of this school of thought for the question of abor22. P. 57 (quoting 3 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS pt. 4, § 52, at 9-10 (G.W.
Bromitey & T.F. Torrance eds. & A.T. Mackey et a. trans., T.&T. Clark 1961) (1951)).
23. P. 62 (quoting DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 166 (Eberhard Bethge ed. & Neville H.
Smith trans., SCM Press 1955) (1949)).
24. Pp. 62-63 (quoting Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Outline for a Book, in LETTERS AND PAPERS
FROM PRISON 210, 210 (Eberhard Bethge ed. & Reginald Fuller et al. trans., SCM Press, 3d ed.
rev. & enl. 1967) (1964)).
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tion are not obvious. As the authors point out, neither Barth nor
Bonhoeffer "offered a clear-cut ethical rule" governing the subject (p.
63). Their position might, however, be described as "anti-choice,"
'2 5
though not "pro-life.
The pro-choice celebration of the autonomous self is plainly antithetical to the ethics of Reformed Protestantism. It is in this sense
that I call them "anti-choice." Celebration of the self and its independence of any obligation not voluntarily assumed elevates the human
being to the place of God at the center of the normative universe and
epitomizes the alienation from God's will that is the essence of sin. As
the authors explain, quoting Barth, "[T]he command of God is an appeal to freedom - not a freedom of 'choice, preference, or selection'
but (again paradoxically) the freedom of obedience." '26 In this
Bonhoeffer, like Barth, could sound very much like his Calvinist intellectual forebears:
[Tihe only appropriate conduct of men before God is the doing of His
will. The sermon on the mount is there for the purpose of being done.
Only in doing can there be submission to the will of God. In doing
God's will, man renounces every right and every justification of his own
27

One might therefore expect Reformed Protestant ethicists to join
with natural lawyers and fundamentalists in forthright opposition to
abortion. An ethics of subordination of the self and service to the
other - an ethics of self-sacrifice in imitation of the suffering of Christ
on the cross - should, one would think, see nothing but negation and
alienation in the practice of abortion. 28 This is especially true because,
in the crucible of Nazism, this school of thought came to recognize the
grave dangers of categorical relegation of some biological humans to

the ranks of the less-than-fully human. As Barth stated, "[E]veryone
should treat his existence and that of every other human being with

respect. For it belongs to God. It is His loan and blessing. ' 29 Somewhat surprisingly, however, Barth and Bonhoeffer drew back from a

categorical condemnation of what Barth called "the wicked violation
25. This is my characterization, not the authors'.
26. P. 58 (quoting 3 BARTH, supra note 22, pt. 4, § 52, at 13).
27. P. 62 (quoting BONHOEFFER, supra note 23, at 166).
28. One could imagine a Reformed Protestant ethic in combination with a libertarian view of
government, producing the view that abortion is wrong but that government should do nothing
about it. The possibility of a libertarian political theology is not explored in The Politics of
Virtue. In the case of Reformed Protestantism as it has developed from Calvin through Barth
and Bonhoeffer, it would be entirely out of place, for this tradition has always seen the government as a powerful instrument for the achievement of social justice. The selective libertarianism
of pro-choice Protestant denominations seems merely expedient, as they appear to have a perfectionist view of politics in every area but this. Those who would use government coercion to
eradicate racism, selfishness, and other sinful attitudes and behaviors have a difficult time explaining why the treatment of the unborn is a private matter.
29. P. 63 (quoting 3 BARTH, supra note 22, pt. 4, § 55, at 340).
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of the sanctity of human life which is always seriously at issue in abortion. '' 30 Barth called the absolute condemnation of abortion "horribly
respectable" and "[n]ever sparing in its extreme demands on women."' 31 As Mensch and Freeman put it, "God's commandment with
respect to abortion is, for Barth, a resolute 'No,' [but] it is a 'No' to be
engaged dialectically by human freedom and conscience" (p. 64). In
his posthumously published Ethics, Bonhoeffer described abortion as
"nothing but murder"; for a "nascent human being has been deliberately deprived of his life." 32 But, he adds, "[a] great many different
motives may lead to an action of this kind; indeed in cases where it is
an act of despair, performed in circumstances of extreme human or
economic destitution and misery, the guilt may often lie rather with
the community than with the individual. '33
Mensch and Freeman obviously believe that the theological ethics
of Barth and Bonhoeffer offers the most promising avenue toward a
principled middle-ground resolution of the abortion question. Despite
their sometimes arcane exposition and starkly theocentric world view,
these theologians suggest a posture toward abortion strikingly congruent with popular opinion: most people consider abortion the taking of
a human life - often embracing even the term murder - but also
believe that there are circumstances serious enough to justify or at
34
least excuse it.
From either the pro-choice or the pro-life perspective, this seems hopelessly muddled and contradictory. There may,
however, be wisdom in it. From the Reformed Protestant perspective,
there is no escaping the fallen human condition. Mensch and Freeman explain, quoting Barth and Bonhoeffer, that
"[ain ethics cannot be a book in which there is set out how everything in
the world actually ought to be but unfortunately is not," for it is the
"unfortunately is not" which is the whole point. It is precisely in the
real, creaturely world, the world as it is, a fallen world, that decisions
35
must be made.
We must never, never treat the taking of human life - even nascent
human life - as a "private" matter of no concern to the just society;
30. P. 64 (quoting 3 BARTH, supra note 22, pt. 4, § 55, at 417).
31. Id. (quoting 3 BARTH, supra note 22, pt. 4, § 55, at 417).
32. Id. (quoting BONHOEFFER, supra note 23, at 131).
33. Id. (quoting BONHOEFFER, supra note 23, at 131).
34. An intensive investigation of public attitudes toward abortion and related issues conducted by the Gallup Organization under the direction of sociologist James Davison Hunter on
behalf of Americans United for Life found that forty-nine percent of respondents consider abortion "murder" and another twenty-eight percent consider it "the taking of human life." See 2
THE GALLUP ORG., INC., GALLUP ORGANIZATION SURVEY ON THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY
IN AMERICA tbl. 29 (Summer 1990). On the other hand, polls consistently show that about

three-quarters of the population would allow abortions in at least some serious situations in
addition to cases involving threats to the life of the mother.
35. P. 57 (quoting 3 BARTH, supra note 22, pt. 4, § 52, at 10 (quoting BONHOEFFER, supra
note 23, at 236)) (footnote omitted).
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nor may we whitewash the reality of abortion with euphemisms about
"tissue" and the "woman's own body." Abortion is an evil, all too
frequently and casually employed for the destruction of life. But the
pregnant woman in distress is one's neighbor, too. Elimination of
abortion may be the goal, but criminal punishment need not necessarily be the means.
It would have been helpful, at this juncture, for the authors to be
more specific about the possibilities for principled compromise. The
Reformed Protestant position, with its paradoxes and dialectics, does
not translate easily into public policy. Barth and Bonhoeffer addressed the abortion question in the context of personal ethics and
pastoral guidance, where individual, case-by-case examinations of circumstances, motivations, and sincerity are both possible and inevitable. The law necessarily must be more categorical - more "legalistic"
and "casuistical." Barth and Bonhoeffer were concerned with sin, forgiveness, and grace, while the law is concerned, first and foremost,
with justice.
Mensch and Freeman are a compelling voice for a principled middle way on an issue for which such voices are few in number. The
American people, despite decades of largely absolutist rhetoric from
both sides, continue to cleave to the middle ground on abortion, yet
virtually no figure in public life has sought to define and clarify that
middle ground or to provide leadership to get there. President Clinton
has stated that he wants abortion to be "safe, legal and rare,"' 36 but all
he has done is make it cheaper and more respectable. With one and
one-half million abortions per year - many of them not "chosen" by
the woman but forced on her by circumstances beyond her control and
lack of knowledge about alternatives - there would seem to be plenty
of room for action that would help to make abortions more "rare."
Unfortunately, in the absence of such actions, the rights rhetoric of
the pro-choice movement serves only to place a collective stamp of
approval on what should be understood as a great social injustice to
the unborn, as well as an avoidable tragedy to the mothers who have
had abortions. 37 The sanctification of abortion as a constitutional
right has contributed to the perception that abortion is a morally and
socially appropriate form of birth control. This is intolerable. The
first object of social policy in this area should be to reduce the number
of abortions chosen by women: not to eliminate their choice, but to
36. See Kevin Sack, Protester Thrusts Fetus at a Surprised Clinton, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15,
1992, at All.
37. Anyone who doubts that abortion is a tragedy for the mother - putting aside the interests of the child - should consult MAGDA DENES, IN NECESSITY AND SORROW (1976); KATHLEEN McDONNELL, NOT AN EASY CHOICE (1984); or MARY K. ZIMMERMAN, PASSAGE
THROUGH ABORTION: THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL REALITY OF WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES

(1977). All of these books are pro-choice, but they recognize the horror of the experience of
taking the life of one's unborn child and its effects on women.
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affect what choice they make. Abortion is at least as serious a social
problem as tobacco.
There is a serious danger - evident in the pronouncements of the
mainline Protestant denominations on the abortion question - that
the "compromise" that comes from Reformed Protestant teaching can
consist of paying lip service to the sanctity of life while doing nothing
about the practice. This is essentially the West European solution
(coupled with some more serious protection for fetal life in the later
stages of pregnancy than we have here), and it seems to satisfy most
people. Let us abolish the "right" of abortion discovered in Roe, declare that all life is deserving of protection, and then do nothing about
it. Under this approach, the protesters, I predict, would diminish
greatly in number; the Supreme Court's docket would be cleared of
these contentious cases; politicians would be off the hook; but the
number of abortions would stay the same. If there is a principled middle-ground position, it must lie in a noncoercive pro-life policy that
works.
CONCLUSION

The title of this book is The Politics of Virtue. This seems to me an
almost complete misnomer, for few, if any, of the serious theologians
whose ideas inspire the book believe that politics is about virtue or that
government can create virtue. Barth and Bonhoeffer speak not of virtue but of sin and grace - of suffering, sacrifice, and redemption,
which are very different things than virtue. The only reference to virtue in the text of the book, to my recollection, is in a discussion of
Aquinas, and for Aquinas the relation between law ("politics") and
virtue is imperfect at best:
Now human law is laid down for the multitude the major part of which
is composed of men not perfected by virtue. Consequently, all and every
vice, from which virtuous men abstain, is not prohibited by human law
but only the gravest vicious actions, from which it is possible for the
major part of the multitude to abstain, and mainly those - like homicide, theft, etc. - which are harmful to others, and without the prohibi38
tion of which human society could not be preserved.
Laws against abortion are designed not to produce virtue but to prevent injustice.
The subtitle of the book, Is Abortion Debatable?, is more to the
point. By "debatable," the authors presumably mean that abortion is
an issue about which debate is both possible and useful. I do not think
that anyone will come away from this book persuaded of any particular thesis or program regarding abortion. I do think, though, that
readers will be in a better position to see why even persons who share
38. P. 38 (quoting JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 168 n.24 (1951) (quoting
Thomas Aquinas)).
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the authors' liberal-left, feminist world view should understand the
abortion issue as a question of justice - not simply of privacy or oppression - and even those of a secular orientation will be able to see
how theological voices can contribute to the debate. Perhaps the first
step toward having a productive debate - and hence toward finding a
peaceful democratic solution - is to listen to one another's arguments
and to stop attempting to rule "out-of-bounds" those whose presuppositions are grounded in religious faith.

